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DETERRING EGREGIOUS VIOLATIONS OF
PUBLIC POLICY: A PROPOSED AMENDMENT
TO THE MODEL EMPLOYMENT
TERMINATION ACT
Dawn S. Perry
Abstract: The Model Employment Termination Act (Model Act), if enacted by state
legislatures, would provide good cause protection to private sector employees. In
exchange for this increased job security, the Model Act limits the range of remedies avail-
able for wrongful discharges. This Comment compares the remedies available under com-
mon law to those embodied in the Model Act and concludes that the Model Act does not
adequately deter abusive discharges in violation of public policy. By amending the Model
Act to include a capped punitive damages provision for egregious violations of public
policy, state legislatures can achieve deterrence without undermining the compromise phi-
losophy of the Model Act.
The doctrine of termination-at-will has pervaded the American
employment relationship since the 1870s. 1 The doctrine permits a pri-
vate sector employer to discharge an employee "for good cause, for no
cause or even for cause morally wrong" without incurring liability.2
Despite widespread scholarly criticism of the doctrine's inequities,'
courts and legislatures have been reluctant to completely abolish the
long-standing at-will presumption.4 Instead, there has been a gradual,
state-by-state erosion of the doctrine of termination-at-will.5 This
piecemeal approach has resulted in widely varied state protections and
remedies for wrongfully discharged employees. For example, if an
employee is fired for filing a workers' compensation claim in Georgia,
there may be no basis for recovery.6 By contrast, if that same
1. This conceptualization of the employment relationship as terminable at-wil is often
attributed to Horace Wood. His inclusion of this principle in his 1877 treatise led to its
widespread adoption in the United States. Sanford M. Jacoby, The Duration of Indefinite
Employment Contracts in the United States and England: An Historical Analysis, reprinted in
WILLIAM J. HOLLOWAY & MICHAEL J. LEECH, EMPLOYMENT TERMINATION: RIGHTS AND
REMEDIES 27-31 (1985).
2. Payne v. Western & Atl. R.R., 81 Tenn. 507, 519-20 (1884), overruled on other grounds,
Hutton v. Watters, 179 S.W. 134 (Tenn. 1915).
3. See, eg., Lawrence E. Blades, Employment At Will vs. Individual Freedom: On Limiting
the Abusive Exercise of Employer Power, 67 COLUM. L. Rv. 1404 (1967); Cornelius J. Peck,
Unjust Discharges From Employment: A Necessary Change in the Law, 40 OHIO ST. L.J. 1
(1979); Clyde W. Summers, Individual Protection Against Unjust Dismissal: Time for a Statute,
62 VA. L. REv. 481 (1976).
4. In 1987, Montana became the first and only state to legislatively prohibit wrongful
discharges. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-2-901 to -914 (1991).
5. See infra note 14 and accompanying text.
6. Evans v. Bibb Co., 342 S.E.2d 484 (Ga. Ct. App. 1986).
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employee is terminated in Illinois, where that state's supreme court
recognizes a common law cause of action for discharges in retaliation
for filing a workers' compensation claim, then the employee would be
entitled to the full range of tort remedies.7 In Maine, the remedies for
the same discharge are prescribed by statute and include the equitable
relief of reinstatement and back pay plus reasonable attorney fees.8
This nonuniformity provided an impetus for development of the
Model Employment Termination Act9 (Model Act) by the National
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws. The Model
Act attempts to balance employee interests in increased job security
against employer concerns about large recoveries in wrongful dis-
charge cases. If enacted by the states, the Model Act would legisla-
tively eliminate the at-will presumption and would require that
terminations be imposed only for good cause.10 This statutory embod-
iment of a good cause requirement represents a radical departure from
current law. Consequently, it is touted by some as one of the most
important recent developments in employment law. I In exchange for
enhanced job security, the Model Act attempts to allay employers'
concerns about large recoveries by limiting the range of available rem-
edies to reinstatement, back pay, attorney fees, and a severance pay-
ment when reinstatement is infeasible. By focusing on the balance
between employers' and employees' interests when formulating this
compromise, the drafters of the Model Act failed to adequately protect
important societal interests. Most state courts have recognized a tort
cause of action when employer discharges threaten to undermine pub-
lic policy. By contrast, the Model Act provides no mechanism for
deterring employer conduct that constitutes an egregious violation of
public policy. Inclusion of a capped punitive damages provision will
remedy this deficiency by establishing a mechanism for deterrence
without subjecting employers to unlimited liability. This amendment
would create the appropriate balance between employer, employee,
and societal interests.
7. Kelsay v. Motorola, Inc., 384 N.E.2d 353 (Il1. 1978).
8. ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 39, § 11 (West 1964 & Supp. 1991).
9. MODEL EMPLOYMENT TERMINATION AcT, reprinted in 540 Individual Empl. Rights
Man. (BNA) 21 (1991) [hereinafter MODEL ACT]. The commissioners stressed the need for
uniformity, "because employees might be hired in one state, work in another, and be fired in a
third .... M prefatory note, at 21.
10. it § 3.
11. Randall Samborn, At-Will Doctrine Under Fire, NAT'L L.J., Oct. 14, 1991, at 1.
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I. COMMON LAW CAUSES OF ACTION AND REMEDIES
FOR WRONGFULLY DISCHARGED EMPLOYEES
A. Common Law Causes of Action
State courts began modifying the steadfast principle of termination-
at-will spurred, in part, by the legal shift towards the protection of
individual employee rights12 and by the "changing legal, social and
economic conditions" in America.13 Three prevalent exceptions to the
doctrine of termination-at-will have emerged. These exceptions
include: 1) violations of public policy; 2) breaches of express or
implied contracts; and 3) breaches of the implied covenant of good
faith and fair dealing. Although some states recognize all three excep-
tions, most have only adopted one or two.14
1. The Public Policy Exception
A majority of state courts recognize that an employee has a tort
cause of action against an employer when the termination contravenes
principles of public policy. 5 Although an employee's interest in job
security is furthered by the public policy exception, this result is only
incidental.1 6 The underlying purpose of this tort exception is to pre-
vent abusive discharges that undermine important public policies. In
general, public policy violations can be divided into three broad cate-
gories. First, courts have held that forcing an employee to choose
between continued employment and performing an unlawful act
12. HENRY H. PERRrI-, JR., EMPLOYEE DISMISSAL LAW AND PRACnCE 12-14 (1984).
Perritt asserts that the shift towards protecting the individual rights of employees is evidenced by
the passage of acts prohibiting discrimination such as Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,
42 U.S.C.A. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (West 1981 & Supp. 1992). Perritt argues that as judges
became more familiar with the protections afforded by discrimination statutes, they also became
less comfortable with the rigidity of the termination-at-will rule. Id. at 12-13.
13. Monge v. Beebe Rubber Co., 316 A.2d 549, 551 (N.H. 1974).
14. Forty-two jurisdictions recognize the public policy exception, 34 have adopted a contract
exception, and 12 recognize the covenant of good faith and fair dealing. Employment At Will:
State Rulings Chart, 505 Individual Empl. Rights Man. (BNA) 51 (1992) [hereinafter State
Rulings Chart]. For a review of state court decisions adopting and interpreting the scope of these
exceptions, see IRA MICHAEL SHEPARD ET AL, WrrIHoUT JUST CAUSE: AN EMPLOYER'S
PRACTICAL AND LEGAL GUIDE ON WRONGFUL DISCHARGE A-3 to A-127 (1989).
15. Identifying public policy has proven problematic, however. Some states accept statutes,
court decisions, regulations, and professional codes of ethics as sources of public policy. Other
states construe this exception more narrowly and only find expressions of public policy contained
in statutes to be sufficient. JOHN C. MCCARTHY, PUNITIVE DAMAGES IN WRONGFUL
DISCHARGE CASES § 1.2 (1985 & Supp. 1988).
16. Jane P. Mallor, Punitive Damages for Wrongful Discharge of At Will Employees, 26 WM.
& MARY L. REv. 449, 459 (1985).
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undermines societal interests in lawful conduct. 17  For example,
employment contingent upon giving perjured testimony would not
only encourage criminal conduct on the part of the employer and
employee, but could also hamper the administration of justice.'8 By
recognizing a public policy exception to the doctrine of termination-at-
will, courts provide employees with a stronger incentive to obey the
law despite the risk of termination.' 9 Second, discharging employees
for exercising a legitimate right or privilege based on statutory20 or
constitutional law21 circumvents public policy interests. By threaten-
ing termination, an employer could prevent an employee from exercis-
ing any rights less valuable than continued employment.22 Third,
terminations in retaliation for the performance of civic duties are con-
sidered violations of public policy, even when those duties are not
mandated by law.23 For instance, many state courts have extended
tort protections to whistleblowing employees by recognizing that their
reports serve important societal interests.24
2. Express or Implied Contract Exception
Employers can bind themselves to a just cause standard for dismis-
sal through express or implied agreements absent any additional con-
sideration.25  Express contracts are created when the duration of the
contract is specified and when the contract prchibits terminations
without cause.26 Implied contracts may be established by oral assur-
17. Eg., Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 610 P.2d 1330, 1336-37 (Cal. 1980) (discharged
for refusing to participate in an illegal price-fixing scheme).
18. Petermann v. Local 396, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 344 P.2d 25, 27 (Cal. Ct. App. 1959).
19. Mallor, supra note 16, at 463.
20. Eg., Perks v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 611 F.2d 1363 (3d Cir. 1979) (discharged for
refusing to submit to a polygraph exam); Kelsay v. Motorola, Inc., 384 N.E.2d 353 (Ill. 1978)
(terminated in retaliation for filing a workers' compensation claim).
21. Novosel v. Nationwide Ins. Co., 721 F.2d 894 (3d Cir. 1983) (holding that a discharge for
refusing to participate in company's lobbying effort contravened constitutional right of free
expression).
22. HOLLOWAY & LEECH, supra note 1, at 272-73.
23. Eg., Nees v. Hocks, 536 P.2d 512 (Or. 1975) (discharged for performing jury duty);
Palmateer v. International Harvester Co., 421 N.E.2d 876 (Ill. 1981) (terminated for supplying
information to law enforcement officials regarding possible criminal violations by a fellow
employee).
24. Twenty-two jurisdictions interpret the public policy doctrine to protect whistleblowers.
James N. Adler & Mark Daniels, Managing the Whistleblowing Employee, 8 THE LAB. LAw. 19,
31 n.39 (1992); eg., Sheets v. Teddy's Frosted Foods, Inc., 427 A.2d 385 (Conn. 1980)
(discharged for trying to ensure that employer's products would comply with labeling and
licensing laws); Harless v. First Nat'l Bank, 246 S.E.2d 270 (WV. Va. 1978) (terminated for
attempting to persuade employer to comply with consumer protection laws).
25. Pugh v. See's Candies, Inc., 171 Cal. Rptr. 917, 925 (1981).
26. 505 Individual Empl. Rights Man. (BNA) 2 (1991).
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ances or statements in company policy manuals. For example, an oral
promise that employment will continue as long as the employee is
"doing the job" could create a contract terminable only for cause.27
Additionally, employment manuals, or other statements of company
policy prescribing the procedures for disciplinary actions may give rise
to legitimate expectations that just cause will be required before dis-
charge.2" In an effort to avoid liability for breach of contract, employ-
ers may include disclaimers in employment applications and company
policy manuals.29 These practices could lessen the protective effects of
this exception.
3. The Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing Exception
Only a small number of jurisdictions recognize the implied covenant
of good faith and fair dealing.30 This exception relies on the notion
that the concept of good faith underlies every contract, including
employment contracts, 31 and requires that neither party do anything
that deprives the other of the right to receive the benefits of the con-
tract.32 Courts have employed this exception to find a breach when
the employee has been "unfairly injured, even when no breach of the
express terms of the contract occurred. ' 33 For instance, this exception
has been used to limit employers' power to terminate employees with
long histories of employment in the same company.34 Other courts
have applied the covenant to employers who terminate in an effort to
avoid compensating their employees.3 5
B. Common Law Remedies for Wrongfully Terminated Employees
Under common law, the type of damages available to a wrongfully
discharged employee is contingent upon the theory of recovery under
which relief is granted. For instance, if the discharge falls within the
27. Toussaint v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 292 N.W.2d 880, 884 (Mich. 1980).
28. Thompson v. St. Regis Paper Co., 102 Wash. 2d 219, 228-30, 685 P.2d 1081, 1087-88
(1984).
29. Eg., Reid v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 790 F.2d 453 (6th Cir. 1986); Thompson, 102 Wash.
2d at 230-31, 685 P.2d at 1088.
30. State Rulings Chart, supra note 14, at 51-52.
31. HOLLOWAY & LEECH, supra note 1, at 62.
32. Cleary v. American Airlines, Inc., 168 Cal. Rptr. 722, 728 (1980).
33. MCCARTHY, supra note 15, § 2.1, at 81.
34. Eg., Cleary, 168 Cal. Rptr. at 729 (longevity of service combined with expressed policy of
employer precluded discharge).
35. Eg., Fortune v. National Cash Register Co., 364 N.E.2d 1251 (Mass. 1977) (fired an
employee of 25 years to avoid paying a large sales commission).
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implied contract exception, then contract damages3 6 are available.
Likewise, damages for a breach of the covenant of good faith and fair
dealing may often be limited to contract damages.37 The public policy
exception, by contrast, is generally founded upon tort principles;
38
therefore, a broader array of remedies is available. In addition to
traditional contract damages, a wrongfully discharged employee can
recover noneconomic and punitive damages when the termination
constitutes a tort.
1. Contract Remedies
Contract law favors the award of monetary damages as the means of
giving the employee the benefit of the breached employment contract.
Although equitable relief in the form of reinstatement is often the pre-
ferred remedy in anti-discrimination statutes,39 courts have long
adhered to the rule that personal service contracts may not be specifi-
cally enforced.' As a result, a prevailing employee is usually limited
to back pay, lost benefits, and, when reasonably foreseeable, front pay
and consequential damages.4 1 Back pay includes all earnings and ben-
efits lost as a result of the termination until the employee becomes
reemployed, is reinstated, or abandons the job search.42 Some courts
allow back pay to accrue up until the time of judgment, however, an
employee has a continuing duty to mitigate back pay damages.4 3 Diffi-
culties arise in determining the appropriate award when an employee
has been unable to find new employment before trial or the new job
36. Usually, the plaintiff is entitled to receive the "benefit of the bargain" had the contract
been fully performed. DAN B. DOBBS, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW Or REMEDIES § 12.1 (1973).
37. There is a split of authority among courts as to whether bad faith terminations should
result in contract or tort remedies. Compare K Mart Corp. v. Ponsock, 732 P.2d 1364 (Nev.
1987) (recognizing tort of bad faith discharge) with Foley v. Interactive Data Corp., 765 P.2d
373, 396, 401 (Cal. 1988) (limiting damages for breach of the implied covenant to contract
remedies) and Berube v. Fashion Centre, Ltd., 771 P.2d 1033 (Utah 1989) (limiting damages for
breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing to contract damages).
38. Alaska, Arkansas, and South Dakota, however, characterize the public policy exception
as a contract action. 1 LEx K. LARSON & PHILIP BOROWSKY, UNJUST DISMISSAL § 9A.01 n.18
(1990).
39. E.g., National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C.A. § 160(c) (West 1973 & Supp. 1992); Age
Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C.A. § 626(b) (West 1985); Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-5(g) (West 1981 & Supp. 1992).
40. Martha S. West, The Case Against Reinstatement in Wrongful Discharge, 1988 U. ILL. L.
REV. 1, 10 (1988). But see Brockmeyer v. Dun & Bradstreet, 335 N.W.2d 834, 841 (Wis. 1983)
(stating that reinstatement and back pay are the most appropriate remedies for wrongful
discharge).
41. LARSON & BoRowsKY, supra note 38, § 9A.02. Consequential damages may include the
expenses associated with searching for another position. Id § 9A.02[7].
42. SHEPARD, supra note 14, at 199.
43. LARSON & BOROWSKY, supra note 38, § 9A.02[4] nn.1-2.
920
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provides less compensation. In those instances, future damages may
be the proper measure.' Front pay awards compensate a discharged
employee until that time when the employee could reasonably be
expected to find reemployment in a comparable position.45 For an
older employee with little prospect of being reemployed in a compara-
ble position, a front pay award may be quite large.'
2. Tort Remedies
Tort remedies generally include the same economic damages avail-
able under a contract action, even though tort damages are based on
proximate cause rather than foreseeability.47 The predominant differ-
ence between tort and contract damages is the availability of
noneconomic and punitive damages48 in tort actions. Noneconomic
damages compensate an employee for intangible losses such as emo-
tional distress49 and damage to reputation. 0 Of the rationales fre-
quently put forth for the imposition of punitive damages," wrongful
discharge cases often emphasize the need to deter egregious violations
of public policy.52 Additionally, without the possibility of punitive
44. A few jurisdictions prohibit the award of future damages for breach of the employment
contract. Id. § 9A.02[5] nn.14-15.
45. SHEPARD, supra note 14, at 200.
46. See, eg., Osterkamp v. Alkota Mfg., Inc., 332 N.W.2d 275 (S.D. 1983) (front pay for 51-
year-old wrongfully terminated employee determined by calculating pre- and post-termination
earning capacity multiplied by work-life expectancy).
47. Contract damages are limited to those reasonably foreseeable at the time the contract was
made. By contrast, tort damages do not depend upon the parties' expectations at the time of
contract. Tort recovery extends to losses proximately caused by the termination. LARSON &
BOROWSKY, supra note 38, § 9A.03[1].
48. Four states do not permit awards of punitive damages at common law: Louisiana,
Nebraska, Massachusetts, and Washington. Mallor, supra note 16, at 449 n.1. Those states only
permit punitive damages when expressly authorized by statute. 2 LINDA L. SCHLUETER &
KENNETH R. REDDEN, PUNITIVE DAMAGES §§ 18.1(A)(18), (21), (27), (47) (1989).
49. Unlike the common law tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress, a damage
award for emotional distress does not require proof of employer intent to cause distress nor does
it necessitate a showing of outrageous behavior. Cagle v. Burns & Roe, Inc., 106 Wash. 2d 911,
726 P.2d 434 (1986); LARSON & BOROWSKY, supra note 38, § 9A.03[2][c].
50. See, eg., Wiskotoni v. Michigan Natl Bank-West, 716 F.2d 378 (6th Cir. 1983).
51. There are seven objectives for awarding punitive damages:
1) punishment of the defendant; 2) specific deterrence, to prevent the defendant from
repeating the offense; 3) general deterrence, to prevent others from committing similar
offenses; 4) preservation of the peace; 5) inducement for private law enforcement; 6)
compensation to victims for otherwise uncompensable losses; and 7) payment of the
plaintiff's attorneys' fees.
MARK PETERSON ET AL., PUNrrvIE DAMAGES: EMPIRICAL FINDINGS 2 (1987).
52. Eg., Kelsay v. Motorola, Inc., 384 N.E.2d 353, 359 (Ill. 1978) ("In the absence of the
deterrent effect of punitive damages there would be little to dissuade an employer from engaging
in the practice of discharging an employee for filing a workmen's compensation claim." The
court reasoned that the compensatory damages alone, which in Kelsay only amounted to $749,
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damages, many lower-paid employees would be unable to retain an
attorney.53 The potential for higher awards associated with punitive
damages also encourages the bringing of meritorious litigation and
compensates employees for injuries not otherwise recoverable. 54
II. A LEGISLATIVE SOLUTION TO WRONGFUL
DISCHARGE: THE MODEL EMPLOYMENT
TERMINATION ACT
In August of 1991, after nearly four years of drafting, the National
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws adopted the
Model Act. If enacted by state legislatures, the Model Act would alle-
viate the uncertainty surrounding the status of wrongful discharge liti-
gation by mandating a uniform good cause standard. Consequently, a
terminated employee would no longer be denied relief just because the
discharge did not fall within one of the state's judicially recognized
exceptions. Additionally, the Model Act's preference for arbitration
attempts to increase access to recovery for low-ranidng employees tra-
ditionally denied relief because of the prohibitive costs of litigation.55
In exchange for the abolition of termination-at-will and increased
access to recovery, the Model Act limits the range of remedies to rein-
statement, back pay, attorney fees, and severance pay when reinstate-
ment is infeasible. This limitation of damages is a key component of
the Model Act's underlying philosophy of compromise.56
A. Scope of Good Cause Coverage
The Model Act prohibits terminations without good cause. 57 The
definition of good cause includes both an objective and subjective com-
ponent. The objective component requires an employer to have a rea-
sonable, job-related justification for terminating an employee. 58 In
rendering this determination, an employer must consider the stand-
"would do little to discourage the practice of retaliatory discharge, which mocks the public
policy of this state.... ."); Hansen v. Harrah's, 675 P.2d 394, 397 (Nev. 1984) ("[Tihe threat of
punitive damages may be the most effective means of deterring condect which would frustrate
the purpose of our workmen's compensation laws.").
53. Under common law, the majority of wrongful discharge plaintiffs are members of
management. JAMES N. DERTOUZOS ET AL., THE LEGAL AND ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF
WRONGFUL TERMINATIONS 21 (1988); Mallor, supra note 16, at 490.
54. Mallor, supra note 16, at 490-91.
55. See Id.; DaRTouzos, supra note 53, at 21.
56. MODEL Acr, supra note 9, prefatory note, at 24.
57. Id. § 3(a).
58. Id. § 1(4)(i). Examples of good cause include discharges for theft, fighting on the job,
drug or alcohol use or possession on the job, insubordination, incompetence, lack of productivity,
and excessive absenteeism. Id § I cmts.
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ards of performance required by the position in relation to the
employee's job performance, conduct, and employment record.59 An
employer may also use its subjective, good faith business judgment to
determine economic goals for the company and the methods for imple-
menting those objectives.6' Terminations resulting from honest busi-
ness decisions are for good cause.61
Good cause protections extend to nonprobationary employees who
work, on average, more than twenty hours per week.6' The Act
excludes independent contractors, those with contracts of a specified
duration, and employers with fewer than five employees.63 Covered
employees may waive their rights to the Act's protections by express
written agreements. This opt-out provision permits return to employ-
ment-at-will so long as the employee receives a minimum schedule of
graduated severance payments. 64 Similarly, those not within the scope
of the Act may opt-in by express written agreements.65
B. Procedures for Dispute Resolution
The Model Act prefers arbitration rather than litigation as the
forum for dispute resolution. This preference for arbitration acknowl-
edges that professional arbitrators possess greater expertise with
regard to work-place disputes, and therefore are better able to resolve
employment difficulties." Additionally, arbitration proceedings are
generally less expensive and more expedient than other forums for dis-
pute resolution.67 Even though arbitration is favored, the Model Act's
arbitration scheme differs from labor arbitration in two significant
respects. First, unlike labor arbitration where arbitrators are often
selected by mutual agreement of the parties,68 the Model Act places
the responsibility for appointing arbitrators on the states.69 Second,
the Model Act places the burden of proof on the complaining
59. Id
60. Id § l(4)(ii).
61. Examples include down-sizing of the work force, consolidation of positions, or changes in
performance standards for certain positions. Idr
62. Id § 3(b).
63. Id §§ 1(1)-(2), 2(b), 4(d).
64. The severance payment must be equal to at least one month's pay for each year worked,
up to a maximum of 30 months at the employee's rate of pay in effect immediately before the
termination. Id § 4(c).
65. Idr § 4(f).
66. Id. Alternative B cmts.
67. FRANK ELKOURI & EDNA A. ELKOURI, How ARBirRATION WORKS 8-10 (3d ed. 1973).
68. Id. at 87.
69. MODEL Acr, supra note 9, § 6 cmts.
923
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employee7° in contrast to the labor arbitration model where the
employer bears the burden of proof.71 Although arbitration is pre-
ferred, the Model Act provides two other alternatives to the choice of
forum: an administrative or judicial proceeding. The administrative
option allows states concerned about the governmental expense associ-
ated with outside arbitrators the choice of employing full-time civil
service personnel to adjudicate disputes, rather than maintaining a sys-
tem of selecting independent arbitrators.72 States may also elect to
retain judicial proceedings if concerned about the constitutional impli-
cations of limiting access to jury trials.73
C. Remedies Available Under the Model Act
An employee discharged without good cause can only be awarded
remedies specifically enumerated in the Model Act. Reinstatement,
although almost never an option under common law, is the preferred
remedy under the Model Act.74 Reinstatement may be awarded in
conjunction with a full or partial award of back pay.75 Because arbi-
tration proceedings are generally more expedient,76 the amount of
back pay, measured from the date of termination until the time of rein-
statement or an award, will likely be smaller than under common law.
Several years may pass under the common law before a wrongful dis-
charge case comes to trial,77 during which time back pay damages
continue to accrue if mitigation efforts have been unsuccessful.
An employee may recover a lump sum severance payment when
reinstatement is not a feasible alternative because of personal relations
between the parties or changes in the employer's business.78 As with
an award of front pay under common law, the severance payment is
70. Id. § 6(e). Placing the burden of proof on the employees has been criticized, because it
requires employees to prove the negative. Employers should bear the burden of proof because
they have the greatest access to information regarding the reasons for termination. Cornelius L
Peck, Penetrating Doctrinal Camouflage" Understanding the Development of the Law of Wrongful
Discharge, 66 WASH. L. REv. 719, 768 (1991).
71. ELKOURI & ELKOURI, supra note 67, at 621.
72. MODEL ACT, supra note 9, Alternative B cmts.
73. Id.
74. Id. § 7(b)(3) cmts.
75. Arbitrators may award "full or partial backpay and reimbursement for lost fringe
benefits, with interest, reduced by interim earnings from employment elsewhere, benefits
received, and amounts that could have been received with reasonable diligence." Id. § 7(b)(2).
76. See id. § 6(c) cmts.
77. A study by the Rand Institute found that, of 120 wrongful &scharge cases sampled in
California, the average length of time for the case to reach trial was 38 months. DERTOUZOS,
supra note 53, at 24-25.
78. MODEL ACT, supra note 9, § 7(b)(3) cmts.
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calculated from the date of the award, however, the Model Act
imposes a three year cap.7 9 In addition to an award of reinstatement,
back pay, or severance pay, the fact-finder may also award reasonable
attorney fees and costs.80
The Model Act specifically excludes compensatory and punitive
damages as well as damages for pain and suffering, emotional distress,
defamation, fraud, or other injury under the common law."' The
exclusion of punitive damages represents a significant departure from
earlier versions of the Act that permitted punitive damage awards for
three types of violations. 2 First, earlier versions permitted a double
back pay award if the termination was a willful violation of the Model
Act and lacking in good faith. 3 Second, the arbitrator had broad dis-
cretion to award punitive damages if the termination constituted a
malicious violation of public policy protections enumerated in the
Act.84 Third, punitive damages were available to employees retaliated
against for participating in proceedings under the Model Act. 5 The
final version of the Model Act, however, prohibits punitive damages,
except when an employer retaliates against an employee lawfully par-
ticipating in proceedings under the Model Act. 6
III. ANALYZING THE REMEDIAL SCHEME OF THE
MODEL EMPLOYMENT TERMINATION ACT
Nationwide adoption of the Model Act would ensure good cause
protection for all employees while at the same time limiting the poten-
tial liability of employers. The remedial provisions of the Model Act,
however, are insufficient for two related reasons. First, the Model Act
does not permit punitive damages for egregious violations of public
policy. Without an explicit punitive damages remedy, public policy
violations may continue unabated. Therefore, states adopting the
Model Act should amend it to include a punitive damages provision.
79. The lump sum severance pay is based on the employee's rate of pay prior to termination
and should not exceed 36 months. Lost fringe benefits may also be included in the award. Like
back pay, the severance payment must be mitigated by earnings and benefits. Id. § 7(b)(3).
80. Id. §§ 7(b)(4), 7(e)-(f).
81. Id. § 7(d).
82. Draft Uniform Employment Termination Act, 540 Individual Empl. Rights Man. (BNA)
71, § 7 (February 23, 1990) [hereinafter 1990 Draft].
83. Id. § 7(b)(3).
84. Id. § 7(b)(8). Public policy protections were extended to two classes of employees: 1)
those discharged in violation of a public policy derived from statutory or constitutional law, and
2) good faith whistleblowers. Id. § 2(d).
85. Id. § 10.
86. MODEL AcT, supra note 9, § 10.
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Second, the Model Act permits employers to exclude employees from
the Model Act's coverage by using waiver agreements. Waiver agree-
ments circumvent the general remedies contained within the Act. In
order to ensure effective deterrence through a punitive damages provi-
sion, waiver agreements should be restricted to a small percentage of
key personnel.
A. The Model Act's Remedies Do Not Adequately Deter Egregious
Employer Misconduct
The Model Act contains no provisions to deter egregious violations
of public policy. This serious shortcoming resulted from the remedial
compromise that eliminated the tort damages available under common
law for public policy violations. Neither reinstatement nor a capped
severance payment award is an adequate substitute for a specific deter-
rent mechanism.
1. A Uniform Mechanism to Deter Egregious Mis'conduct is
Necessary
The common law public policy exception is premised on the protec-
tion of important societal interests such as promoting lawfulness, pro-
tecting legal fights, and encouraging the performance of civic duties.
Courts recognize that employers can use the threat of termination to
coerce employees to commit illegal acts, abrogate employees' fights,
and prevent employees from performing civic duties.87 For instance,
employees who are aware that filing a workers' compensation claim
will result in subsequent termination are likely to forego statutorily
guaranteed compensation in order to retain their jobs. 8 Thus,
employers can effectively circumvent the entire workers' compensation
scheme by restraining employees from filing claims. 89 To prevent such
circumvention, state courts created a cause of action entitling employ-
ees to the full panoply of tort remedies for retaliatory discharges.
The Model Act, however, eliminates the potential for tort damages
without establishing a systematic method for deterring the most egre-
gious violations of public policy. Instead, the Model Act delegates to
the states the responsibility for creating a remedial scheme for viola-
tions of public policy and termination of whistleblowers. Comments
in the Act provide that, "[B]y statutory enactment any state may pro-
vide separate, independent remedies for certain classes of terminated
87. See supra notes 15-24 and accompanying text.
88. Kelsay v. Motorola, Inc., 384 N.E.2d 353, 357 (Ill. 1978).
89. Id.
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employees-for example, whistleblowers and the victims of egregious
violations of public policy-which are broader and more extensive
than those prescribed by this Act."'  This comment implicitly recog-
nizes that some violations could be so egregious as to warrant reme-
dies greater than those explicitly set forth in the Model Act.
Failure to prescribe the appropriate remedies for egregious termina-
tions will result in an ad hoc, nonuniform response by state legisla-
tures. State responses could range from no action to codification of
the state's recognized public policy protections, thereby, creating even
greater variability under the Model Act. In addition, statutory protec-
tions for whistleblowers currently differ substantially from state to
state.91 Consequently, the Model Act's failure to prescribe the appro-
priate remedy for whistleblowing will perpetuate nonuniformity in
whistleblower protections while eliminating safeguards in states that
currently recognize a tort cause of action.
2. Reinstatement is an Inadequate Deterrent
Reinstatement cannot effectively deter egregious violations of public
policy for two reasons. First, although the Model Act prefers rein-
statement, it is unlikely to be awarded in many circumstances. Sec-
ond, even when reinstatement is awarded, the deterrent effect will be
minimal because an employer is unlikely to be financially impacted by
such a remedy.
The Model Act does not mandate reinstatement if relations between
the parties or changes in the employer's business render it infeasible.92
Because tension and hostility between the employer and employee
often accompany employment discharges, both parties may be reluc-
tant to return to the previous employment relationship. For example,
studies of the effectiveness of reinstatement under the National Labor
Relations Act (NLRA) found that a large portion of employees termi-
nated for engaging in union activity declined the option to be rein-
stated. Most who refused reinstatement cited the fear of backlash or
retaliation as the predominant reason. 4 In general, employers are also
90. MODEL ACT, supra note 9, § 2 cmts.
91. Adler & Daniels, supra note 24, at 22-25. Fourteen states statutorily protect
whistleblowers against retaliation by private employers: California, Connecticut, Hawaii,
Louisiana, Maine, Michigan, Minnesota, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, Ohio, Rhode
Island, Tennessee, and Wisconsin. Id. at 24 n.17.
92. MODEL ACT, supra note 9, § 7 cmts.
93. West found that, between 1970 and 1979, 32% of workers declined offers of
reinstatement. Two empirical studies based on smaller samples found the rate of rejection of the
reinstatement option to be as high as 50% and 59%. West, supra note 40, at 28-29.
94. Others declining reinstatement had secured alternate employment. Id.
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hesitant to reinstate an employee who has been judged undesirable9 or
disloyal. This inherent tension may result in frequent determinations
that reinstatement is infeasible.
Reinstatement is unlikely to deter future employer misconduct
when awarded, because it is the least costly remedy from the
employer's perspective. Unlike a monetary damage award, reinstate-
ment represents a return to the pre-termination conditions. In addi-
tion, empirical studies suggest that the duration of reinstatement is
relatively short in the absence of a union support mechanism. For
example, among employees reinstated under the NLRA, few were still
on the job two years later.96 Most employees had resigned alleging
unfair treatment and only a small number were terminated a second
time.97 Although success rates are higher when reinstatement is
achieved pursuant to arbitration under a collective bargaining agree-
ment,98 this success has been attributed to the union's daily presence
and control over the process.99 The combination of these factors
instills a greater sense of security in employees. 10 Moreover, in the
union setting both parties agree to arbitration; it is not imposed by
statute.101 Even though the Model Act forbids retaliation against
employees who participate in proceedings under the Act and permits
those employees to sue for damages including punitive damages,10 2 the
effectiveness of this provision as a replacement for the union structure
is uncertain. This uncertainty is magnified by the Model Act's failure
to define "retaliation." Employers can subject employees to much
unpleasantness that would fall far short of termination or constructive
95. Thomas J. McDermott & Thomas H. Newhams, Discharge-Reinstatement: What Happens
Thereafter, 24 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 526, 535 (1970-71).
96. West, supra note 40, at 29-30. One empirical study conducted from 1962 to 1964 found
that 30% of reinstated employees were still employed two years later. Another study conducted
from 1971 to 1972 documented that only 11% of those reinstated were still employed after two
years. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 38-39. One study found that four years after reinstatement by an arbitrator, 63 out
of a total of 111 reinstated employees remained. Arthur M. Ross, The Arbitration of Discharge
Cases: What Happens After Reinstatement, in CRITICAL ISSUES IN LABOR ARBITRATION 21, 33,
54 (Jean T. McKelvey ed., 1957).
99. West, supra note 40, at 39-40. The shorter time period for dispute resolution under
arbitration may also be a supporting factor. Id. at 39.
100. Id. at 39-40.
101. Id. at 39.
102. An employer who takes "adverse action in retaliation against an individual for filing a
complaint, giving testimony, or otherwise lawfully participating in proceedings under this [Act],
... is liable to the individual subjected to the adverse action in retaliation for damage caused by
the action, punitive damages when appropriate, and reasonable attorney fees." MODEL ACT,
supra note 9, § 10.
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discharge.103 For instance, an employer can assign unpleasant tasks,
increase supervision over the employee, or deny promotions. Proving
that these more subtle employer actions constitute retaliation could be
difficult without more express prohibitions in the Model Act.
3. Severance Pay is an Inadequate Deterrent
When reinstatement is infeasible, the only available remedy is a
lump sum severance payment. The Model Act's severance payment
formula, however, will not serve as an adequate deterrent mechanism
for two reasons. First, the tone of the Model Act discourages high
severance pay awards. Although a thirty-six month severance pay-
ment is possible,1" the maximum is unlikely to be awarded except in
very rare cases. For example, even when the fact-finder determines
that a discharged employee is unlikely to find new employment within
the thirty-six month period, the comments warn against awarding the
maximum "as a matter of course."' ' Second, principles of mitigation
apply to any award, thereby subjecting a severance payment to further
deductions.) The ability to predict that monetary awards will be rel-
atively low in most instances seriously diminishes the deterrent value
of the severance payment contained in the Model Act.
Although the severance payment provision allows the fact-finder to
take into account equitable considerations such as the reasons for ter-
mination, 10 7 allowing higher awards for egregious violations would be
inconsistent with the Model Act's ban on punitive damages. The com-
ments explicitly provide that the "concept of proportionality"1 8 be
used when calculating a severance pay award. This principle limits
the employer's liability to the amount of the employee's likely loss for
which the employer is responsible."° Even though the Model Act
permits consideration of the reasons for termination, it cannot result
in an award in excess of the employee's predicted loss, because puni-
tive damages are banned. 10 Rather than increasing an employee's
recovery, this provision will more likely be interpreted as reducing the
employer's responsibility for an employee's loss when the employer's
103. Constructive discharge occurs when an employee has quit or retired because conditions
are so intolerable that a reasonable individual would quit or retire. Id. § 1(8)(iii).
104. See supra note 79 and accompanying text.
105. MODEL AcT, supra note 9, § 7(b)(3) cmts.
106. Id. § 7(b)(3); see also SHEPARD FT AL., supra note 14, at 205-08.
107. MODEL AT, supra note 9, § 7(b)(3).
108. Id. § 7(b)(3) cmts.
109. Id.
110. Id. § 7(d). Punitive damages are only permitted when an employee is retaliated against
for participating in proceedings under the Model Act. Id. § 10.
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actions constitute a less flagrant violation of the good cause standard.
For example, if an employer dismisses an employee for undesirable
behavior that falls just short of the good cause threshold, the fact-
finder might conclude that the employee was partially responsible for
the losses, thereby reducing the severance pay award. Because of the
prohibition on punitive damages, severance pay awards cannot be
increased for egregiousness, but may be decreased for lack of egre-
giousness. As a result, the severance pay award cannot effectively
deter egregious violations of public policy.
B. Waiver Agreements Preclude Effective Deterrence
The availability of waiver agreements will allow employers to cir-
cumvent important public policies. For example, if an employee signs
a waiver agreement, an employer who fires that employee for refusing
to commit an illegal act will not face any greater consequences than an
employer who terminates an employee due to personality conflicts.
An employee excluded from good cause protections by a waiver agree-
ment is only entitled to one month's pay for each year worked regard-
less of the reasons for termination."' Employer liability is, therefore,
completely predictable. This lack of deterrence is especially problem-
atic, because not only are management-level employees the most likely
to be opted-out of the Act's good cause coverage,' 12 they are also the
most likely personnel to be fired for reasons that violate public poli-
cies. 113 For instance, employers will most often direct pressure at
management-level employees to commit illegal acts such as falsifying
records, fixing prices, or violating professional codes of ethics. 1
Low-ranking employees will rarely be in positions that require them to
perform illegal acts or face termination. Additionally, whistleblowers
are more frequently high-ranking employees who are privy to more
information about company practices.1 15
Although comments in the Model Act indicate that waiver agree-
ments are not intended to create "contracts of adhesion,"'1 6 most
employees will not be in a position to resist waiver agreements. Only
unusually qualified employees have power to bargain for job secur-
111. Id. §4(c).
112. Id. § 4(c) cmts.
113. Note, Protecting Employees At Will Against Wrongful Discharge" The Public Policy
Exception, 96 HARV. L. REv. 1931, 1945-46 (1983); Blades, supra note 3, at 1408.
114. Note, supra note 113, at 1945-46; accord Blades, supra note 3, at 1408-09.
115. Note, supra note 113, at 1946.
116. MODEL ACT, supra note 9, § 4 cmts. The "[d]istinctive feature ofadhesion contract[s] is
that [the] weaker party has no realistic choice as to its terms." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 40
(6th ed. 1990).
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ity.117 Most management-level employees are replaceable and thus
will be subjected to significant pressures to enter into waiver agree-
ments. 11 The inability of most employees to avoid waiver agreements
and the small, predictable level of liability associated with waiver
agreements precludes deterrence of egregious violations of public
policy.
C. Proposal for Amending the Model Act
Inclusion of a punitive damages provision similar to that contained
in previous drafts of the Model Act will provide a well-defined deter-
rent mechanism and uniform enforcement. Until 1990, the Model Act
permitted punitive damage awards for malicious violations of public
policy, including terminations that violated public policies derived
from statutory or constitutional sources, and terminations of good
faith whistleblowers. 119 Resurrection of that provision, accompanied
by a cap on the amount of punitive damages allowable, will achieve
deterrence without undermining employer interests in limited liability.
In addition, state legislatures should amend the current waiver provi-
sion so that only key personnel can be opted-out of the Act's coverage.
1. A Punitive Damages Provision Would Promote Important Public
Policies
An express punitive damages provision would deter egregious mis-
conduct by employers and encourage employees to bring meritorious
claims against employers. Older versions of the Model Act permitted
punitive damages when the termination violated public policies
derived from statutes or constitutions and when the discharge was in
retaliation for good faith whistleblowing.120 Inclusion of a punitive
damages provision in the Model Act facilitates deterrence of egregious
117. Blades, supra note 3, at 1411-13. Even if an employee is able to bargain for just cause,
the terms of the contract will expire at some point, exposing the employee to possible coercion
near the date of renewal. lId at 1412.
118. Employers are permitted to fire employees within six months after the effective date of
the Act for refusing to enter into a waiver agreement. MODEL AcT, supra note 9, § 14. The
drafters explicitly state that a waiver agreement can be "impose[d] as a condition of continued
employment." Id
119. 1990 Draft, supra note 82, § 7(b)(8).
120. See supra note 84 and accompanying text. Montana, the only state with a wrongful
discharge statute, permits awards for punitive damages when the termination is in retaliation for
the "employee's refusal to violate public policy or for reporting a violation of public policy."
MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 39-2-904(1), 39-2-905(2) (1991). For a discussion of the events leading
up to the adoption of the Montana statute, see LeRoy H. Schramm, Montana Employment Law
and the 1987 Wrongful Discharge From Employment Act: A New Order Begins, 51 MONT. L.
REV. 94, 108 (1990).
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conduct in two ways. First, because egregious conduct is defined,
employers have advance notice121 that a discharge would be wrongful
and can avoid liability for punitive damages by not terminating. Sec-
ond, employers who terminate in violation of public policy despite the
notice provided by the Act will be liable for greater damages than
those employers whose terminations are not egregious. The potential
for higher awards in the form of punitive damages increases the uncer-
tainty of liability, thereby increasing deterrence of discharges that
undermine societal interests.1 22 This added deterrence is especially
important when the other remedies are quite small.1
23
The availability of punitive damages would also provide employees
with a greater incentive to engage in lawful conduct, pursue legal
rights, and report infractions of the law even though such conduct
could result in termination. The Model Act's current remedial scheme
provides little incentive for employees to engage in such socially desir-
able conduct and bring meritorious claims. Although the availability
of attorney fees may make the costs of bringing a claim less prohibi-
tive, attorney fees do not encourage employees to file claims against
employers for egregious terminations. Moreover, the potential for
reinstatement or a severance pay award may not provide the requisite
incentive, because reinstatement is likely to be unsuccessful1 24 and sev-
erance payments are likely to be small.125 The potential for punitive
damages could supply the additional monetary incentive employees
need to challenge egregious employer misconduct. As more meritori-
ous claims are brought against employers whose terminations violate
public policy, deterrence is increased.
121. Permitting punitive damages when statutory or constitutional notice exists is an
improvement over the common law approach of refusing punitive damage awards in cases of first
impression. As Mallor argues,
it seems absurd to argue that when a statute forbids the conduct involved, punitive damages
should be withheld merely because the employer did not know that it would be subject to
civil liability for the discharge. The implication that employers are not aware of statutes but
are aware of appellate court decision strains credulity.
Mallor, supra note 16, at 483.
122. For example, Congress amended Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 to include
compensatory and punitive damages for intentional discrimination. Civil Rights Act of 1991,
Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071. The punitive damages were added specifically to deter and
punish "egregious discrimination" and to reinforce the public policy against discrimination. 137
CONG. Rec. H9526 (daily ed. Nov. 7, 1991).
123. See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
124. See supra notes 93-103 and accompanying text.
125. See supra notes 104-06 and accompanying text.
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2. A Punitive Damages Provision With Caps Strikes the Proper
Balance
The addition of a capped punitive damages provision serves to deter
egregious violations of public policy without threatening employers'
pecuniary interests. As part of the Model Act's compromise philoso-
phy, employees cannot recover noneconomic damages, nor can they
recover under the other tort actions commonly associated with wrong-
ful discharge, such as defamation or intentional infliction of emotional
distress. '26 This elimination of common law remedies under the
Model Act will substantially reduce the potential employer liability for
wrongful discharges, thus, the insertion of a limited punitive damages
provision would not undermine the compromise. By adopting a puni-
tive damages provision with a graduated cap similar to that found in
the 1991 Civil Rights Act, 127 the goal of increased deterrence for egre-
gious violations of public policy could be satisfied while at the same
time protecting employers against large, devastating awards.
Although employers may argue that a punitive damages provision
would undermine the compromise philosophy of the Act, a graduated
cap would eliminate the extreme awards that employers fear most.
This fear results from highly publicized and costly verdicts. In fact,
such verdicts often precede wrongful termination legislation.128  For
example, in California, a verdict for $20 million led to a legislative
proposal requiring just dismissals.129 Although reports of high awards
invoke employers' fears, they can be quite deceptive. According to a
1988 study by the Rand Corporation,"' which evaluated 120 wrong-
ful discharge verdicts, the ten largest awards accounted for 75% of the
total dollars awarded in all 120 trials. 3 In addition, the Rand study
126. Independent tort actions can only be maintained if there are facts separate from the
termination that support the cause of action. MODEL AcT, supra note 9, § 2(c) cmts.
127. Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071. The 1991 amendments to
the Civil Rights Act provide for both compensatory and punitive damages. The combined total
of punitive and compensatory damages are capped according to a graduated scale. For instance,
an employer who employs 20 workers may only be held liable for a maximum of $50,000 in
damages, whereas, an employer with 200 workers may be held liable for up to $200,000. Id.
§ 102(b).
128. Alan B. Krueger, The Evolution of Unjust-Dismissal Legislation in the United States, 44
INDUS. & LAB. REL. REv. 644, 650 (1991). Even the drafters of the Model Act point to multi-
million dollar verdicts and other high awards as evidence that a legislative scheme is warranted.
MODEL AcT, supra note 9, prefatory note, at 23.
129. Krueger, supra note 128, at 650.
130. DERTouzos, see supra note 53, at 26.
131. Id. Half of all awards were less than $177,000. Id.
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found that punitive damages were only awarded in one third of the
wrongful termination cases.' 32
These statistics indicate than an outright abolition of all punitive
damage awards is unnecessary. Instead, state legislatures can prevent
crippling awards by instituting a scheme based on caps that are more
closely related to the average rate of punitive damages. A legislative
cap on damages would be beneficial for two reasons. First, capping
punitive damage awards has the advantage of not chilling legitimate
business decisions. Without caps, the fear of high punitive damages
could prevent an employer from firing an employee even when good
cause exists. Second, a graduated punitive damages scheme protects
smaller employers who may often be less sophisticated and more likely
to "commit legal mistakes." '133 If smaller employers were liable for
the same amount of punitive damages as their larger counterparts, the
costs could be devastating. A cap is necessary to protect both busi-
nesses and the workers they employ. Conversely, in order to make an
impact on wealthy employers, the penalty imposed must be greater.
By including a punitive damages provision with a graduated cap,
deterrence of egregious violations of public policy can be achieved at
all levels without undermining employer interests in containing costs.
3. Limiting Waiver Agreements Ensures Effective Deterrence
The Model Act must strictly limit the use of waiver agreements in
order to prevent employment terminations in violation of public pol-
icy. Although employers have a compelling interest in exempting top
management personnel, whose positions require high levels of trust,
cooperation, and accountability, the legitimacy of those interests
decreases at lower levels in the administrative hierarchy. The Model
Act, however, fails to specifically delineate the type of employees who
can be opted-out of the good cause coverage. Consequently, an
employer may exclude as many employees as it desires through waiver
agreements including a large percentage of management-level person-
nel who are the most likely to be dicharged for refusing to commit an
unlawful act or whistleblowing. 34 Restricting waiver agreements to a
small percentage of key personnel designated by the employer1 35
132. Id.
133. Mallor, supra note 16, at 492.
134. See supra notes 113-14 and accompanying text.
135. Clyde Summers, Employer Coverage and Employee Eligibility, in PROTECTING
UNORGANIZED EMPLOYEES AGAINST UNJUST DISCHARGE 83 (Jack Stieber & John Blackburn
eds., 1983). Summers proposes that employers designate a percentage of employees (ranging
from one to five percent) for exclusion under a wrongful discharge statute. Other commentators
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would provide a better solution for three reasons. First, employers can
retain greater control over employment decisions pertaining to crucial
personnel. Second, high-ranking employees designated as key person-
nel by an employer likely possess the greatest bargaining power and
may independently contract for job security. Third, the integrity of a
punitive damages provision is maintained because the class of employ-
ees most likely to be terminated for egregious reasons, middle-manage-
ment, will not be opted-out of the Model Act's protections. Without
this limitation on the use of waiver agreements, the effectiveness of a
punitive damages provision could be substantially reduced for a large
class of employees traditionally vulnerable to termination in violation
of public policy.
IV. CONCLUSION
The Model Act, if enacted, represents a significant departure from
the law of wrongful discharge developed by state courts. Not only
does the Model Act impose a uniform good cause standard on
employee terminations, but the remedies available for wrongful termi-
nations are limited to reinstatement, back pay, attorney fees, and sev-
erance pay when reinstatement is infeasible. Under common law,
most states permit tort recovery for public policy violations; however,
the Model Act's compromise philosophy has eliminated the potential
for high awards against employers without instituting a specific deter-
rent mechanism. Both reinstatement and severance pay are inade-
quate substitutes for an explicit punitive damages provision. By
employing a graduated scale for capping punitive damage awards,
deterrence can be achieved without sacrificing employers' interests in
reduced liability. In conjunction with a punitive damages amendment,
state legislatures should revise the waiver agreements provision of the
Model Act so that only key personnel can be excluded from the good
cause protections. This limitation prevents waiver agreements from
undermining the efficacy of a punitive damages provision by excluding
middle-management employees who are the most likely victims of
egregious terminations in violation of public policy.
935
have proposed excluding employees entitled to a pension above a certain amount. See, eg.,
Theodore J. St. Antoine, A Seed Germinates: Unjust Discharge Reform Heads Toward Full
Flower, 67 NEB. L. Rav. 56, 72 (1988).
